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Abstract Karl Polanyi started his career as a doctor of law and practiced law
for a while; but he did not become a legal scholar. As an economic historian,
anthropologist, or sociologist, he was concerned with the relation of economy and
society. But even though law is an important factor in mediating this relationship,
Polanyi gave little attention to the law as such. As part of an endeavour to advance
a ‘Polanyian’ economic sociology of law, this article develops the ‘law of market
society’ as an analytical category. For this purpose, three argumentative strategies
are combined. First, the article draws on The Great Transformation to reconstruct the
role of law in the processes of commodification and decommodification. Second,
it turns to Marxist scholarship to explore the conceptual link between law and
economics and to ponder to what extent law itself can become a commodity. Third,
it links Polanyi’s approach with American institutionalism, and Commons’ work in
particular, to show how the evolution of the ‘law of market society’ can also be
understood as a collective enterprise which continuously evolves. It is argued that
these perspectives complement each other and help to bring the law back in where
it is missing.
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Karl Polanyi und das Recht der Marktgesellschaft
Zusammenfassung Am Anfang von Karl Polanyis Laufbahn stand ein juristischer
Doktortitel, und er arbeitete auch einige Zeit als Jurist, aber aus ihm wurde kein
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Rechtswissenschaftler. Als Wirtschaftshistoriker, -anthropologe bzw. -soziologe be-
fasste er sich mit dem Verhältnis von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Obwohl das Recht
dabei ein bedeutender Vermittlungsfaktor ist, wurde es von Polanyi als solches we-
nig beachtet. Im Bemühen um eine ‘Polanyi’sche’ Wirtschaftssoziologie des Rechts
entwirft dieser Aufsatz das ‘Recht der Marktgesellschaft’ als analytische Kategorie.
Dazu werden drei Argumentationsstrategien miteinander verknüpft. Zum einen wird
ausgehend von The Great Transformation die Rolle des Rechts im Kommodifizie-
rungs- und Dekommodifizierungsprozess rekonstruiert. Zum anderen wird mithilfe
marxistischer Ansätze der konzeptionelle Zusammenhang von Recht und Ökonomik
ergründet wie auch die Frage, inwieweit Recht selbst zur Ware werden kann. Drittens
wird Polanyis Ansatz mit dem Amerikanischen Institutionalismus, hier insbesondere
den Arbeiten von Commons, in Verbindung gebracht, um zu verdeutlichen, dass sich
die Evolution des ‘Rechts der Marktgesellschaft’ auch als kollektives Unterfangen
verstehen lässt, das sich laufend weiterentwickelt. Diese Perspektiven können ein-
ander ergänzen und dabei helfen, dem Recht den nötigen Stellenwert einzuräumen.
Schlüsselwörter Karl Polanyi · Recht · Vereinigte Staaten ·
Institutionenökonomik · John R. Commons
1 Introduction: Polanyi’s vocation
Karl Polanyi (1886–1964) started as a student of law. When he turned eighteen in
1904, he took one of the options available for members of the educated class and
enrolled in the law faculty. In 1909, Polanyi completed his studies as a doctor of law
(Múcsi 1990, p. 27), which was a professional rather than scientific degree (Dale
2016, p. 298, note 5). One of his teachers was Gyula Pikler, whose positivist legal
philosophy resonated with the socialist student movement, which Polanyi became
part of at the time (Múcsi 1979). Pikler’s lessons about the historical contingency
and changeability of the law may have had an influence on Polanyi’s legal thinking
(Stanfield 1986, p. 4). The hostility that Pikler’s progressive scholarship encountered
did have an effect on Polanyi’s intellectual practice: it led to the formation of the
Galilei Circle (Múcsi 1990, p. 28), a name suggested by Pikler (Szegedi 2005,
p. 441). In contrast, the legal profession as such was of little appeal to Polanyi. In
1910, he started working as a clerk at his uncle’s law office. In 1912, he was admitted
to the bar and became a full member of the legal profession. In her “memory of his
memories” (Duczynska Polanyi 2006, p. 310), Polanyi’s later wife Ilona recalls that
the careers carved out for the three Polanyi brothers in business, law and medicine,
respectively, in each case took ironic turns. This is most obvious in Karl’s case, “who
was quite unable to tell a fib in the interests of a client” and, instead, “found his
true vocation in telling disagreeable truths—at all times and in all circumstances”
(ibid., pp. 307–308; original emphasis): as a social scientist and public intellectual.
The First World War ended Polanyi’s dismal legal career.
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In this article, I will explore a perspective that remained underdeveloped in
Polanyi’s work because he was more of an economic historian, anthropologist,
and sociologist than a legal scholar: the law of market society (Frerichs 2016).1
This captures the role of law in the commodification process as well as its poten-
tial for decommodification. In order to compensate for Polanyi’s limited interest in
analysing the law as such, I will relate his work to two congenial approaches in the
study of capitalism, which explicitly link law with economics: Marxist scholarship
on the one hand and American institutionalism on the other. Since the commonalities
with the latter seem less straightforward, a specific contribution of this article will
be to establish Polanyi’s affinity with ‘old’ institutional economics, on which the
literature is scant (Stanfield 1980; Neale and Mayhew 1983; Neale 1990). Together,
these ‘complements’ of Polanyi’s work add important perspectives on the law of
market society: of law as a commodity as well as of law as an institution.
2 A shared intellectual heritage
The backdrop for these two contextualisations of Polanyi’s work, which may help to
give a fuller account of the law of market society, can be found in a shared heritage.
The writings of Karl Marx and the contributions of the early American institutional-
ists both have their origins in historical, comparative and holistic scholarship, which
was the prevailing approach to the social sciences in nineteenth-century continental
Europe. This shared heritage may also explain parallels between the two intellectual
traditions in linking law, economy, and society. This can be illustrated as follows.
In the nineteenth century, the (German) historical school of jurisprudence, the
(German) historical school of economics, and classical historical sociology all
formed part of a broader current of scholarship interested in studying societies as
organic wholes. Scholars of this generation laid emphasis on the particularities of na-
tional collectives and the interdependencies between different social spheres, instead
of confining law, economy, and society to separate disciplines. Marx adopted the
historical-holistic approach but gave it a critical twist, which was directed against the
inherent conservatism of contemporary scholarship. While he polemicized against
the historical school of jurisprudence (Marx 1842), which he had become acquainted
with early on in his studies (Kelly 2003, p. 11), his intent to complement the critique
of political economy with a critique of jurisprudence (Fine 2013) illustrates the link
between law and economics as it developed in historical scholarship.
The historical school of economics, which drew inspiration from its forerunner in
jurisprudence (Pearson 1999, p. 548), flourished in the second half of the nineteenth
century but began to fade in the wake of the Methodenstreit (dispute over methods),
which took place at the turn of the twentieth century, and the ensuing reorientation of
the economic discipline towards greater formalism. However, their substantive ap-
proach to the economy not only found resonance in Polanyi’s work (Gemici 2008,
p. 20), but also inspired American institutionalism. In the late nineteenth century
1 The concept of law here encompasses legislation (Gesetz) and justice (Recht). Moreover, the notion of
the ‘law of market society’ also hints at law’s relation with the quasi-natural laws of the market.
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Germany was a prominent destination for US students to complete their PhDs in
political economy, including Edwin R. A. Seligman and Richard T. Ely, who later
taught at Columbia University in the City of New York and the University of Wis-
consin-Madison, respectively. Upon return to their home country, these German-
trained scholars formed a ‘new school’, which was opposed to the classical English
tradition of political economy: “Deductive reasoning in economics was held to be
suspect: proper procedure called instead for direct empirical investigation of eco-
nomic reality. Similarly, the notion that economic ‘laws’ could be identified—ones
with universal validity throughout time and space—needed to be purged.” (Barber
2008, p. 239) In political terms, the dogma of laissez-faire was replaced with a more
favourable view on state intervention (ibid.). These new convictions, which reflect
the basic tenets of the German historical school (Cardoso and Psalidopoulos 2015,
pp. xv–xvi), laid the ground not only for American institutionalism, but also for the
‘first law and economics movement’ (Hovenkamp 1990).
In the twentieth century, Marxist scholarship and American institutionalism came
to fulfil similar functions in different scientific and political contexts. Whereas in
Europe much critical scholarship on economy and society, including the role of the
state and its law, was rooted in the work of Marx (notwithstanding numerous debates
and departures from Marxist orthodoxy), this influence was much less significant
in American scholarship. As Hodgson put it, “[t]he virtual absence of Marxism in
America provided more space for institutionalism” (Hodgson 1994, p. 375). At the
same time, the strong presence of the Marxist (and Post-Marxist) tradition in Europe
created little demand for imports of institutionalist thought from the US (ibid.). In
the following, I will first give an account of the law of market society in Polanyi’s
work and link it with Marxist scholarship. Subsequently, I will turn to American
institutionalism and its understanding of law in modern capitalism, and again draw
links with Polanyi’s work.
3 The law of market society
An often cited passage in The Great Transformation depicts the ‘market society’ as
a society in which markets have become a predominant principle of social organi-
sation: “Instead of economy being embedded in social relations, social relations are
embedded in the economic system.” (Polanyi 1957b [1944], p. 57) As a system of
social provisioning, the economy can be organised in different ways, and markets
may only play a subordinate role in the overall setting. In the market economy,
markets are ‘unleashed’ from their surroundings, which, according to Polanyi, has
tremendous consequences for society: “For once the economic system is organized
in separate institutions, based on specific motives and conferring a special status,
society must be shaped in such a manner as to allow that system to function ac-
cording to its own laws.” (ibid.) The ‘law of the market’ comes to affect society as
a whole (ibid., p. 71). This turn from the ‘social embeddedness of the economy’,
which is considered the historical norm in Polanyi’s substantive approach, to the
“embeddedness of economic markets in economics” (Callon 1998), which we find
in modern capitalism, involves a shift in the concept of embeddedness from a nor-
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mative to a cognitive understanding (Frerichs 2011). Accordingly, the proliferation
of free markets is, ultimately, an artefact of economic thinking: the “philosophy of
economic liberalism” (Polanyi 1957b [1944], p. 269).
In The Great Transformation law is occasionally mentioned, but Polanyi does not
develop the law of market society as an analytical category. His references to law
can be systematised along different stages of economic development. In pre-market
societies, markets remain embedded in a complex of “custom and law, magic and
religion”, which keeps the gain motive in check (ibid., p. 55). Hence, neither the
law nor the market would follow their own logic, as it is often taken for granted
today. As to the formation of the market society, the ‘disembedding’ of the market
from social relations and its ‘embedding’ in economic thinking are explained by
the ‘discovery’ of economics as a science of society, which stipulates new laws
of nature: “As gradually the laws governing a market economy were apprehended,
these laws were put under the authority of Nature herself.” (ibid., p. 125) This
novel way of thinking removes the law of the market from the purview of man-
made law, while the policy of laissez-faire still has to be enforced by regulatory
means (ibid., p. 139). Law becomes instrumental in the commodification of land,
labour and money, with property relations, work relations and debt relations being
subjected to market forces. The market-constitutive function of law can be contrasted
with its market-constraining function in the context of decommodification, or the
‘re-embedding’ of market exchange through protective legislation. For Polanyi, the
latter serves the self-defence of society. Law can thus act both as a commodifier and
a decommodifier.
4 The commodification of law
Polanyi’s account of the market society owes much to Marx’s critique of politi-
cal economy, even though Polanyi distances himself from Marx in some respects
(Polanyi Levitt 2006, p. 387). Thus, he explicitly distinguishes his concept of ‘fic-
titious commodities’ from “Marx’s assertion of the fetish character of the value of
[genuine] commodities” (Polanyi 1957b [1944], p. 72, note 8). To gain a deeper
insight into the law of market society it nonetheless makes sense to link Polanyi
back to Marx and explore developments in Marxist legal theory (Frerichs n.d.).
Marx’s distinction between economic base and legal and political superstructure
is often interpreted in terms of an economic determinism, which makes law appear
as an ‘epiphenomenon’. Building on Marx’s work, Evgeny Pashukanis and Isaac
Balbus developed a ‘commodity form theory of law’ which goes beyond both the
‘instrumentalist’ assumption that law is determined by the will of the capitalist class,
and the ‘formalist’ assumption that law would follow its own, autonomous logic.
More precisely, they speak of a ‘homology’ between the commodity form on the
one hand and the legal form on the other (Beirne and Sharlet 1980, p. 3; Balbus
1977, p. 577, note 5). Accordingly, basic legal categories are imbued with the logic
of market exchange, which is generalised as a form of social organisation. In fact,
capitalist society as such could be understood “above all [as] a society of commodity
owners”, who mutually agree to exchange commodities on the market (Pashukanis
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1980 [1924], p. 75). This is reflected in the institutions of legal personhood, freedom
of contract, and private property, which are not simply understood as reflections of
the ‘nature’ of human relations, but legal fictions that fulfil a function in capitalist
society. Besides organizing the market society, they also serve its legitimation: the
formal equality of subjects of rights conceals asymmetries in initial endowments
and unequal bargaining power in the market.
A deficiency of the commodity form theory is that it first of all applies to private
law as it was conceived in classical legal thought. If private contracts are taken as
the prototype of legal relations, public law appears but as a “reflection of the form of
private law in the sphere of political organization” (Pashukanis 1980 [1924], p. 73).
While this applies to the formation of the market society in the nineteenth century, the
rise of socially oriented legislation in the twentieth century cannot easily be captured
in these terms (Kennedy 2006). The turn to the ‘social’ is a hallmark of legal realism,
which sought to overcome the formalism of classical legal thought. It was not only
more public-spirited than the latter but also turned to ‘law in action’, that is, to
how law works in reality. With Polanyi, we can speak of a countermovement within
law and legal discourse, which no longer identifies law with the principle of formal
equality, but also considers it as a means to bring about social justice. This obviously
fits with the idea of decommodification.
However, in the last few decades, the related ‘law and society’ movement seems
to have been crowded out by a corresponding ‘law and economics’ movement, which
again emphasises law’s economic function. Going beyond both the commodity form
theory of law and Polanyi’s account of fictitious commodification, we can claim
that, under the influence of economic thinking, law may itself become a commodity,
which has a market price, just like the fictitious commodities of land, labour and
money. The commodity character of law is most concrete when regulatory com-
petition allows a ‘law market’ to arise, and a certain legal rule or regime can be
marketed and shopped for at the national, regional or global level (O’Hara and Rib-
stein 2009). Academically, it is promoted by the ‘economic analysis of law’ (Posner
1972), which studies the efficiency of legal institutions in a neoclassical or neoin-
stitutional framework. Inspiration is drawn from the Coase theorem, which suggests
that legal institutions do matter in a world of transaction costs.
5 Institutional Law and Economics
Whereas the more recent movement of law and economics treats law as a production
factor among others, the first wave of law and economics shares basics insights with
Polanyi’s work and may, therefore, serve as a more legally attuned complement of
the latter (Frerichs and James 2018). Leading representatives of what can also be
referred to as ‘original’ law and economics are John R. Commons, a student of
Ely, and Robert Lee Hale, a student of Seligman. In the following, I will focus on
Commons’ work, which offers a “synthetic and synoptic theory of the economic
sphere” and stands out in that it is equally concerned with the “legal foundations
of capitalism” and the “economic foundations of law and politics” (Samuels and
Biddle 1995, pp. 51 and 53; my translation).
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Commons distinguishes institutional economics from other, more traditional
schools of economic thought by its focus on relations, rules, and transactions,
instead of individuals, commodities, and exchange (Commons 1990 [1934], p. 73).
His notion of institutions is specified as “collective action in control of individual
action” (ibid., p. 69), which refers to the role of agreed rules and shared customs in
regulating behaviour. These are defined as ‘working rules’, or law in the broadest
sense, including official law (private law, public law) as much as the written or un-
written rules of business (shop rules, codes of conduct, business ethics) (Commons
1924, pp. 6 and 147). The focus of Commons’ analysis is on the normative accept-
ability of certain types of behaviour in a given community or institutional setting,
which defines individual rights and duties in the first place (ibid., pp. 138–140).
This viewpoint of public interest is ideally represented by (some kind of) judges,
who decide about how best to interpret the existing rules in cases of conflict (ibid.,
p. 242).
Like Polanyi, Commons deals with the commodification of land, labour, and
money, albeit not in these terms. Instead, he focuses on the change of rules brought
about by the ‘rent bargain’ (regarding private ownership of land), the ‘wage bargain’
(regarding the collective organisation of labour), and the ‘credit bargain’ (regarding
the negotiability of debt): political compromises achieved in the medium of law.
Like Pashukanis, Commons discusses the concepts of private property, contractual
freedom, and legal personhood, which can be considered constitutive of capitalism as
such. However, he also demonstrates that these concepts assume different meanings
in different phases of capitalist development (agricultural, commercial, industrial).
In the end, Commons is less concerned with the philosophy of economic liberalism
than with the practices of ‘regulated capitalism’ (Commons 1990 [1934], p. 93).
Accordingly, the law of market society is created and shaped in an ‘artificial selection
process’, which describes the workings of the political economy as a whole (ibid.,
p. 377).
6 Polanyi in the United States
Before taking stock of how these different intellectual traditions—Marxist scholar-
ship on the one hand and American institutionalism on the other—can improve our
understanding of the law of market society, it seems worth exploring an important
turning point in Polanyi’s career: his move to the United States. Having emigrated
to England in 1933, Polanyi was quickly invited to the US for lecture tours. In 1940
he was granted a three-year fellowship at Bennington College in the State of Ver-
mont. It was during this stay that he completed The Great Transformation, central
ideas of which had been developed in Europe (Polanyi Levitt 2006) while others
seem to converge with “the mid-century critique of economic society” in US schol-
arship (Immerwahr 2009, p. 446). More to the issue at hand, it has been argued that
the change in Polanyi’s intellectual surroundings may have severed his allegiance
with Marxist thinking (Block 2003), which, in turn, may have found expression in
adopting an explicitly institutionalist framework. But this is not the point I want to
make. The purpose of this biographical spotlight is to document Polanyi’s intellec-
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tual proximity to American institutionalism without putting one legacy against the
other.
After returning to England in 1943, Polanyi was appointed visiting professor of
economics at Columbia University in 1947 and relocated to the US (and Canada,
for his private home). In previous decades, Columbia had been one of the biggest
centres of American institutionalism next to the University of Wisconsin (Rutherford
2016, p. 314). Even though American institutionalism had lost influence by the
middle of the century, Polanyi’s appointment could still be seen as an effect of
institutionalist sympathies (Rutherford 2004, pp. 66–67). It may have helped that
Polanyi had begun to make his “institutional method” more explicit at that time
(ibid., p. 67). After his retirement in 1953, he still continued as a research leader. For
over a decade in his late career, Polanyi thus got immersed in the American context.
The ambitions of Polanyi’s institutional approach are reflected in a lecture given at
Columbia University in 1950, which is entitled “The Contribution of Institutional
Analysis to the Social Sciences”, as well as his later essay on “The Economy as
Instituted Process” (Polanyi 1957a). The former includes the following definition:
“Institutional analysis stands here as an abbreviation for a more definite approach to
the economic aspects of human society in general than formal or scarcity economics
could provide. Essentially, it is that variant of institutional economics that represents
a shift back from the formal to the more popular substantive meaning of ‘economic’.”
(Polanyi 2014b [1950], p. 58; original emphasis).
7 Institutional economics à la Polanyi
The fact that Polanyi presented his work as a ‘variant of institutional economics’
raises the question of whether there is only a superficial convergence in institu-
tionalist terminology, or whether there is a more fundamental convergence in in-
stitutionalist thought. On the one hand, references to American institutionalism are
largely absent from Polanyi’s writings (Stanfield 1980, p. 613, note 43), even though
there are some notes on Thorstein Veblen (Polanyi 2014a). On the other hand, there
are hints that some of the classics of American institutionalism were discussed in
the context of the ‘Interdisciplinary Project on Economic Aspects of Institutional
Growth’ (1953–1958), which Polanyi led after retiring from teaching, and namely
in the project’s ‘Continuation Group’, which still convened in the years after the
project had formally ended (Polanyi 1959). This circle included Harry W. Pearson
and Walter C. Neale, who were given the tasks to examine the works of Commons
and Clarence Ayres, respectively (Neale 1990, p. 150, note 2; Pearson 1959).
Neale later refers to Pearson as the one who stirred his deeper interest in reading
Commons (Neale 1987, p. 1205, note 30), whose notion of ‘working rules’ was
key in developing Neale’s own understanding of institutions (Neale and Mayhew
1983, pp. 11 and 15). From 1958 onwards, Neale held teaching positions at the
University of Texas at Austin, one of the remaining centres of institutional economics
after neoclassical economics had come to dominate the discipline (Rutherford 2016,
p. 325). While he concedes that “as of 1950” one might not have considered Polanyi
as one of the “great American institutionalists” (Neale 1990, p. 145), he eventually
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made a case for elevating Polanyi to their ranks at a faculty evening seminar in 1967
(Adams 1990, p. 327). Twenty years later, Neale published an article on institutions
in the Journal of Economic Issues, the flagship of American institutionalism (Neale
1987). This piece contains references to Veblen, Commons, and Ayres, amongst
others, while the acknowledgements include “special debts to Karl Polanyi, my
mentor in these matters” (ibid., p. 227). Neale’s work thus exemplifies that it is
entirely possible to merge Polanyi’s ideas with those of American institutionalists.
To conclude my argument, I will briefly demonstrate how an institutional analysis
along the lines of Commons’ approach may overcome limits inherent in Polanyi’s
original account of commodification. In The Great Transformation, the law of mar-
ket society is circumscribed by its role in the processes of commodification and
decommodification. While the market-constraining function of law is evident in
socially oriented legislation, the market-constitutive function of law goes down to
fundamental legal concepts, which represent the “dogmatic foundations” of the mar-
ket (Supiot 2007, p. 94). This yields a dichotomous picture of two types of law with
distinctive, or even antagonistic, rationalities, which in principle would counteract
each other in one and the same political-economic system. Such a perspective has
difficulties grasping the complexities of contemporary forms of capitalism, which
are marked by commodification and decommodification at the same time. In ‘welfare
capitalism’, social protection does serve an economic function.
Commons shared Polanyi’s interest in “the tendency inherent in an industrial
civilization to transcend the self-regulating market by consciously subordinating it
to a democratic society” (Polanyi 1957b [1944], p. 234). Yet, for him, this was
not a harbinger of socialism. Instead, his hope was in “making [capitalism] good”
(Commons 1934, p. 143). He was particularly interested in how the increase in col-
lective control and collective action, which began to show in the “new working rules
of new associations and unions” (Commons 1924, p. 140), would change the legal
framework of the economy. Rather than framing this ‘tendency’ in terms of alterna-
tive political-economic systems, he studied it from an open-ended institutional point
of view, which allows for more variety within the capitalist setting. This approach
seems more productive to understand the institutional flexibility and resilience of
contemporary capitalism, including its many intertwinements of economic and social
law.
8 Conclusion: Commodity or Institution?
This article aimed to show that a Polanyian account of the law of market society can
benefit from insights into the relation of law and economics by Marxist scholarship
on the one hand and American institutionalism on the other. This yielded two com-
plementary perspectives: of law as a commodity and of law as an institution. At first
glance, these may appear as different ideal types of law: Law as a commodity serves
private interests, is tagged with a price and available for sale on the law market. Law
as an institution is supposed to promote the public interest and embody “collective
reasoning” in a community of citizens (Commons 1924, p. 352; emphasis omitted).
However, as analytical perspectives, these two may well be combined, and the law
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of market society can be considered as ‘institutionalised’ and ‘commodified’ at the
same time.
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